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unemployment cost on the shoulders of the employing group in the particular industry. Making each industry responsible for its own unemployment, so the argument runs, will avoid the weakness of most state unemployment schemes abroad by focusing attention on eliminating the causes of the evil rather than on alleviating the distress of the individual workman. An unemployment fund, assessed on employers in proportion to their responsibility, will force preventive action by those who are in a position to control employment. This direct tax, whatever its ultimate incidence, will force better planning, more efficient organization and more intelligent direction of industry.

Mr. Wolman's pamphlet admits that the causes of unemployment lie in part beyond the jurisdiction of the individual industry, but argues that the more serious factors can in large measure be controlled within that jurisdiction and that progress is to be sought through experimentation by industries, leaving more general supplementary measures to follow.

Such in general is the brief for an unemployment scheme for the clothing industry. With the argument and the general theory underlying it few students of industrial organization will be inclined to quarrel seriously. The trend of experimentation abroad at present, especially in England, is in this direction, and there are now some precedents on which to build. More than this it is impossible to say until the present pamphlet, which undoubtedly has educational value, is followed by another in which the administrative details of the proposal are completely worked out.

C. N. HITCHCOCK

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The High Cost of Strikes. By MARSHALL OLDS. New York: Putnam and Sons, 1921. Pp. xx+286.

A glance at the opening paragraphs of chapters chosen at random in this book reveals such statements as this:

CHAPTER II—

When you had to pay \$55.00, \$65.00 or \$75.00 for a suit of clothes during 1919-20, about \$20.00 or \$30.00 of that price was due to strikes.

CHAPTER V—

Coal cost \$3.75 a ton at the mine in July 1920. This price included the cost and profit to the operator and all labor cost of mining, including the making the product ready for the ultimate consumer. Yet at exactly

the same time coal cost \$17.00 a ton in New England. The basic reason was strikes, but strikes entirely outside of the coal field.

CHAPTER xiv—

Nothing in the way of good industrial relations is to be expected from organized labor as represented by the American Federation of Labor and the four Brotherhoods. The only peace which can come out of those organizations is the peace of an absolute domination—not only of the American industries but of the government itself.—Dr. CHARLES W. ELIOT, *President Emeritus of Harvard University*.

CHAPTER iv—

The families of over 200,000 workers in Detroit had an unexpectedly gloomy 1919 Christmas because over 200,000 workers suddenly lost most of several weeks wages through a strike of other workers hundreds of miles away.

These are all topic paragraphs of a stimulating sort but the absence of factual material to verify them reduces the interest and forces the conclusion that the book is blatant and empty.

Mr Olds follows the usual method of computing the costs of strike by dividing the losses into three categories—the losses in wage to the employees, the losses in profit to the employers, and the losses to the public, emphasizing in particular the loss to the strikers. As far as can be discovered the loss to the latter has been arrived at by multiplying the number of supposed strikers by the wages they would have received had they worked during the time of the strike. For statistics as to the number striking in particular cases the writer has depended upon current gossip to approximate the truth; he is not concerned with exactness.

Just how dependable are conclusions based upon the statements from common sources of information can be illustrated by the steel strike. The union leaders, according to the *Monthly Labor Review of the Department of Labor* for September, 1920, on the first day of the strike, September 22, 1919, announced that 279,000, men were idle. The next day the number was given as 327,000, and two days later as 340,000, whereas the employers denied the figures and declared that less than 40 per cent of this number had gone out. September 30 the unions announced that 80 per cent of the employees of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation had obeyed the call of their organization, and the employers countered with the announcement that 88 per cent of the employees were at work. The Inland Steel Company, of Indiana Harbor, on the same day claimed that 3,000 of their employees had

returned, whereas the union stated that the number was 250. Similar instances could be given illustrating even a wider range of difference. The reason for these differences in statements, of course, is not difficult to infer. Our inference, however, does not give us the facts; neither does Mr. Olds in his book.

Not only is there no evidence of care taken in computing the numbers striking but the duration of strikes is stressed as if it were a norm upon which to compute losses by simple arithmetic. Apply the rule: The Boston policeman strike lasted three days and then the men voted to return to work. The public officials, however, refused to accept their return. What is the duration of the strike? Three days. But certainly the loss cannot be computed by taking the number of men out on the strike and multiplying by three. Neither can such a method be of any great value in other situations where workers are dribbling back to work from the day the strike is announced until it is formally called off by either party.

Along with the losses it does not occur to Mr. Olds that there may be such a thing as gains from strikes as far as the workers are concerned, aside from possible increases in wages or better conditions which may make the struggle worth while. Strikes are often times profitable if the men have power so that workers can get employment in other industries near at home or out of town while the strike is on. Thus the Chicago waiters' strike of 1920 was dated so the waiters could find temporary work at the summer resorts which were just opening. Also, it is possible sometimes for the men to use their efforts at other necessary tasks about the household. If, because of a strike, a man has time to make repairs or perform work which otherwise would cost something, it is hardly fair to measure his loss from the strike by the wages which he has failed to receive from his employer. Many items should be posted upon the balance sheet; there are gains as well as losses.

Moreover the time spent in striking may simply postpone the demand for labor and cause employment for the worker at a time when otherwise he might be unemployed. Such a statement does not blindly embrace the lump of labor fallacy; it suggests exceptions to the rule. For example, it may be said, perhaps, with a certain degree of truth that the striking of coal miners partakes of the nature of vacation. The work waits to be done by them; and their striking may not reduce appreciably the total work days of the year or the total wage received in the year.

The fact that in this book Mr. Olds does not display either the knowledge, method, or inclination to get at facts in a discriminating way, does not argue that there is no need for a study of the costs of strikes. Certainly, there is in strikes a large element of waste; some of it inevitable, some of it controllable. Full knowledge of the facts (and these facts will only be secured through minute studies of particular strikes) may impress the worker, the employer, and the community with the necessity of reducing the number of strikes.

But let us not delude ourselves. Should all parties admit the loss from strikes, still the fact remains that, damaging though the strike is both to the direct participants and to the public, it is the chief weapon which labor feels it can depend upon to work out its future. To place their lot in the hands of the employers or even of the public and to accept in docile spirit what is given them, is an impossible concept from the workers' point of view. And control must be in terms of what is possible.

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The New World: Problems in Political Geography. By ISAIAH BOWMAN, PH.D. Illustrated with 215 maps and with 65 engravings from photographs. Yonkers-on-Hudson, N.Y.: World Book Co. 1921. \$6.00.

The future will have to decide whether the United States played the rôle of Parsifal, the pure fool, in the world-war or rather that of Don Quixote fighting valiantly in a world of self-created illusions. What is certain at this present moment is that the country is passing through a violent reaction, and that after performing heroic rescue work for the benefit of the maiden Europa, it has ungallantly and capriciously left her in the lurch. From this emotional disgust the author of the present book tries to wean his wayward countrymen by the psychologically admirable device of substitution. He serves up the post-war world as it is and, quietly ignoring the romantic past and the evil taste it has left behind, he appeals to the intelligence of his readers in the calculation that if they can be induced to bring, instead of their hearts, their minds to bear upon the situation of the contemporary world they will take a fresh and invigorating hold on it.

Dr. Bowman has turned out a notable work. He propounds the proposition that the post-war world may no longer be conceived